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Delay, Detect, Defend: Preparing for a Future in which Thousands Can Release New Pandemics

Professor Kevin Esvelt, Director of SecureBio, lays out the Delay/Detect/Defend framework in a white paper for the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

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    Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?

  2. Forensics Crook et al. (2022)
    Nature Communications 13 : 7374

    Analysis of the first genetic engineering attribution challenge.

  3. Esvelt (2022)
    Geneva Centre for Security Policy

    Delay, Detect, Defend: Preparing for a Future in which Thousands Can Release New Pandemics

  4. Esvelt (2022)
    Senate Testimony

    Credible pandemic virus identification will trigger the immediate proliferation of agents as lethal as nuclear devices

  5. Sandbrink et al. (2022)
    Gene Therapy

    Insidious Insights: Implications of viral vector engineering for pathogen enhancement.

  6. NAO NAO Consortium (2021)

    A Global Nucleic Acid Observatory for Biodefense and Planetary Health

  7. Rojas et al. (2021)

    A Scalable Solution for Signaling Face Touches to Reduce the Spread of Surface-based Pathogens

  8. Bradshaw et al. (2021)

    The feasibility of targeted test-trace-isolate for the control of SARS-CoV-2 variants

  9. Bradshaw et al. (2021)
    Nature Communications 12 : 232

    Bidirectional contact tracing could dramatically improve COVID-19 control

  10. Forensics Alley et al. (2020)
    Nature Communications 11 : 6293

    A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity

  11. SecureDNA Baum et al. (2020)

    Cryptographic Aspects of DNA Screening

  12. SecureDNA Gretton et al. (2020)

    Random adversarial threshold search enables specific, secure, and automated DNA synthesis screening

  13. Esvelt (2018)
    PLOS Pathogens 14 : e1007286

    Inoculating science against potential pandemics and information hazards

  14. Lipsitch et al. (2015)
    Ann. Intern. Med. 163 : 790-791

    Calls for Caution in Genome Engineering Should Be a Model for Similar Dialogue on Pandemic Pathogen Research